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Abstract
Significant ambiguity still surrounds the aid-growth relationship despite fifty 
years of research on the subject. For the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a 
possible reason for the lack of consensus is that until recently the influence of 
political stability on the aid-growth relationship had been largely ignored despite 
its relevance for the region. Further, although overlooked by the literature, 
the Instrumental Variable (IV) technique, the preferred treatment method of 
endogeneity in aid-growth relationships, may be ineffective in eliminating 
endogeneity bias because typical instruments for aid are neither sufficiently 
exogenous nor strong. Using a dataset of 31 SSA countries from 1984-2007, 
we re-visit the question of whether aid can spur growth in SSA using first-
differencing (FD) to eliminate unobserved effect endogeneity while focusing 
on the role of political stability on the aid-growth relationship in SSA. Results 
suggest aid promotes growth conditional on political stability in SSA and that 
First Differencing (FD) eliminates a substantial amount of the endogeneity 
bias. Our results demonstrate the pertinence of a stable political environment 
to attaining the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for SSA countries 
since these goals inherently assume that aid can promote growth.
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1. Introduction
Despite repeated warnings by economists of its futility, the developed 
world still provides lots of aid to SSA to spur economic growth (Leeson, 2008; 
Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010) . SSA has absorbed almost one trillion nominal 
aid dollars over the last fifty years but the growth record has been unimpressive 
(Mayo, 2009 and Easterly, 2006) . The insistence of developed countries to 
bestow aid on SSA is not so confounding if one considers that ambiguity still 
surrounds the effect of foreign aid on growth (Naito, 2010 and Bruckner, 2011) . 
In particular, estimation of the aid-growth relationship is fraught with different 
kinds of endogeneity problems (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bruckner, 2011 
and Minoiua, and Reddyb, 2010) . Further, since SSA has been racked by political 
instability, a question emerges about the effect of political stability on the aid-
growth relationship in the region . Given the uncertainty about the effect of aid 
on growth, and the possible consequences of political stability on the aid-growth 
relationship, this paper seeks to: (1) empirically determine if aid and growth are 
related using recent SSA data, and (2) identify the effects of political stability 
on the aid-growth relationship in SSA after accounting for possible endogeneity 
bias .
 The article contributes to the literature in three main ways . First, it 
focuses on the SSA region and employs recent data in estimating the effect of 
political stability on the aid-growth relationship . Second, it uses a dependable 
measure of political stability constructed with Political Risk Service (PRS)’s 
ICRG dataset to identify the effect of political stability on the aid-growth 
relationship in SSA . Finally the possibility of endogeneity bias is addressed: 
The current literature treatment of endogeneity with IV is criticized while FD is 
justified and employed in estimation of the aid-growth regression. Aid is found to 
be positively and significantly related to growth in SSA conditional on political 
stability after minimizing endogeneity bias. This result confirms Islam’s (2005) 
finding that aid promotes growth in stable but not in unstable LDCs. 
2. Literature Review
There are valid theoretical arguments as to why the effect of aid on growth 
might be positive, negative, linear, nonlinear or even ambiguous (Easterly, 
2006 Hansen and Tarp, 2001). On one hand, “Gap theory” contends that aid 
promotes growth by augmenting the investment and foreign exchange needed 
for production and growth (Chenery and Strout, 1966) .  On the other hand, 
countries that receive aid might consume it, leading to aid-dependence (Bauer, 
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1984, 1991and 2000; Mayo, 2009; Rajan, and Subramanian, 2011; Arndt, Jones 
and Tarp, 2010) .  Clearly, aid might hurt or promote growth, so the effect of aid 
on growth remains an empirical question (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 and 
Bruckner, 2011) . Comprehending the exact relationship between aid and growth 
is, however, crucial to SSA countries and donors as they seek to realize the UN’s 
MDGs because the MDGs inherently posit that aid is growth-promoting . The 
stated aim of the MDGs is to halve severe $1/day poverty between 1990 and 
2015 using aid as one strategy (Sachs, 2005 and Collier, 2007) so it’s vital to 
ascertain with a  reasonable degree of confidence how aid affects growth in SSA.
 Entangled in the debate on how aid affects growth are differences in 
the structure of the economic model, the context under which aid is effective, 
the econometric procedures employed and the data used . In particular, the effect 
of aid on growth is likely to be context-specific therefore identifying the salient 
features of the context received a lot of attention in the literature . Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) (henceforth BD (2000)) identified good macroeconomic policy 
as the salient contextual condition for aid to promote growth . They found that 
the aid-growth relation is positive for countries that maintain sound economic 
policies but negative for countries with inappropriate policies, basing their result 
on a positive and significant interaction term involving aid and policy. BD (2000) 
included a dummy for SSA which proved negative and significant in aid-growth 
regressions, indicating that the aid-growth effect may be different for SSA . This 
point is noteworthy as effective policy might be insufficient to guarantee the 
efficacy of aid in promoting growth in SSA. Not surprisingly, the contention that 
aid promotes growth given good policy has been successfully challenged in the 
literature . For example, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) showed that the 
positive aid effect given good policy disappears when either more time series 
data or different countries are used in the data set. In contrast, Islam (2005) finds 
that the aid-growth relationship must be conditioned on political stability, not 
macroeconomic policy as political stability is the more pertinent determinant of 
the efficacy of aid in stimulating growth. 
 Like Islam (2005), our objective is to investigate whether political 
stability influences the aid-growth relationship. However, we limit our dataset 
to SSA because this is our region of interest . We employ a unique measure 
of Political Stability (henceforth, PS) constructed from a dataset of political 
stability tracked by Political Risk Service (PRS) to investigate the effect of 
political stability on the aid-growth relationship . We also address two types of 
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endogeneity also identified by Hansen and Tarp (2001): (i) simultaneity (caused 
by feedback from growth to aid) and (ii) unobserved effects endogeneity caused 
by correlation between latent, time-invariant country-specific effects in the error 
matrix and the matrix of right hand side variables .  Both types of endogeneity 
can cause bias in OLS estimation of aid-growth relationships so their deleterious 
effects need to be properly mitigated . While the aid-growth literature only now 
focuses on reducing bias due to unobserved effect endogeneity, it abounds with 
attempts to control simultaneity bias using IV . There is however limited literature 
that focuses on evaluating whether the typical instruments for aid used in IV 
estimation of aid-growth regressions satisfy the exogeneity and strength criteria 
defined for valid instrumental variables analysis (Deaton, 2008).  This research 
will help close that literature gap . For example, population and rainfall may be 
endogenous in the growth equation for SSA countries . Therefore, in contrast to 
the IV treatment of the endogeneity of aid by Islam (2005), Bruckner (2001), 
Acemoglu (2001) and majority of the aid literature, typical instruments for aid 
are actually invalid instruments for aid . Colonial legacy (Islam 2005), however, 
can be argued to be an exogenous instrument since it is not determined by 
contemporaneous economic performance . However, it’s not excludable; that is it 
belongs to the true model and should enter the growth equation as an explanatory 
variable and not as an instrument .
3. Empirical Model 
The model used in this paper is a modified version of Islam’s (2005) 
empirical aid-growth model which was derived from Solow’s (1956) theoretical 
growth model and is standard in the aid-growth literature . Following Islam 
(2005), aid is hypothesized to affect growth through its effect on savings and 
investment .  Political stability affects the aid-growth link through its effect on 
the ability of a nation’s citizens to accumulate capital, save, invest and innovate . 
In particular a stable political environment can lead to effective economic 
policies and correct investment decisions both of which can spur growth . In a 
stable political environment aid is then just new capital and should logically 
contribute to growth (Hansen and Tarp, 2001) . The effects of political stability 
on the aid-growth relationship can thus be captured in the empirical model by 
the interaction between political stability and aid . The empirical growth model 
employed is presented in (1)-(3) and used to investigate the relationship between 
economic growth and foreign aid, as well as the effects of political stability on 
the aid-growth relationship in SSA . 
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GROWTH is GDP per capita growth, AID, is foreign aid or Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA), AID2 is the square of AID, PS is political 
stability, PS2 is the square of political stability, AIDPS is the interactions of PS 
with AID, and γ0 is the overall constant . The vector Z includes variables that 
control for initial conditions affecting growth, and recent literature provides 
guidance for their selection (Islam, 2005) .  Z contains variables such as initial 
level of income (represented by initial GDP or IGDP), standard deviation of 
aid (STAID), level of education (PRIM), quality of institutions (represented by 
international country risk guide (ICRG)’s quality of bureaucracy and democratic 
accountability variables, BQUAL and DACC), government consumption as a 
portion of GDP (GCONS), and the money supply as proportion of GDP or (M2) . 
Different from Islam (2005) but consistent with Rajan, and Subramanian (2011), 
Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) and Minoiua and Reddyb (2010), we explicitly 
specify the unobserved effects which are likely correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the error term. Thus, εit is a composite error consisting of a country-
specific component, εi and an iid error term, ν it which has variance σ.
2 We include 
a set of time dummies, one for each four-year period, to account for potential 
cyclical effects such as downturns in the world economy that may affect the aid-
growth relationship .
The sign of the relationship between aid and growth remains an empirical 
question and may depend on the countries examined (Easterly, 2003) . Political 
stability is expected to positively promote growth . While quality of institutions, 
level of education and the money supply variables are expected to be positively 
related to growth, government consumption and the standard deviation of aid are 
expected to be negatively correlated with growth . Initial GDP will also likely 
reduce growth as dictated by conditional convergence (Barro, 1996) . Following 
Easterly, Levine, and Dollar (2004) the square of aid is also included as a regressor 
in the growth equation to account for other possible types of non-linearity . 
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4. Data Description and Summary Statistics
The aid data are from SourceOECD while the political stability data are 
from the Political Risk Service (PRS) . The growth data and the remainder of 
the data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
the Penn World Tables, and the World Banks’ Africa Database CD . The data 
come from 31 SSA countries for which data were available, range from 1984 
to 2007 and cover six four-year periods (i .e . 1984-1987 to 2004-2007) . Apart 
from possible sample selection bias that may emerge since not all SSA countries 
are included in the dataset, there are also missing observations leading to an 
unbalanced panel . 
It is also plausible that countries with worse institutions (or more likely to 
be afflicted by war) are less likely to have good quality data so they manifest 
as missing data in the sample . Such countries are perhaps also more likely to 
have a zero aid-growth relationship; so their absence would bias OLS results up . 
Note, however, that the included SSA countries are spread within the SSA region 
and there is no evidence of a well-defined data generating process by which 
the SSA countries were picked therefore sample selection bias is unlikely to be 
severe . With regards to missing data, of the 186 observations, 90 % of the data 
have complete sets of observations so the missing data problem will have limited 
consequence in OLS estimation even if more data is lost through lagging or first 
differencing . 
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Table 1 . Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables .
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Sources . a World Development Indicators; bOECD-DAC’s online Source OECD database; cWorld 
Bank’s Africa Database C; dSachs and Warner (1995); eConstructed variable; fInternational Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) of Political Risk Services (PRS) and gDefined in detail in text.
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Table 1 on the previous page contains definitions and descriptive statistics of 
variables based on six four-year observations and provides detailed information 
about data sources and transformations of key variables used in the growth 
regression in (1) . The conversion of the annual data into four year periods 
is consistent with the time it takes for aid to manifest into growth (Moreira, 
2005; Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004) . Correlations between the main 
explanatory variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 2 on the next 
page . The correlations between the variables are low, typically less than 0 .4, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not severe and should not distort statistical 
inference . Aid is negatively correlated to political stability and initial GDP, 
respectively (-0 .19) and  (-0 .24), implying aid is not systematically allocated to 
politically stable countries .  
Table 2 . Correlation Matrix of Selected Explanatory Variables .
 IGDP Aid POL PS PRIM M2 BQUAL DACC LE GCONS INVPROF
IGDP 1           
AID -0 .197 1          
POL -0 .064 0 .364 1         
PS -0 .009 -0 .248 0 .082 1        
PRIM 0 .032 0 .207 -0 .028 0 .091 1     
M2  0 .303 0 .129 0 .199 -0 .107 0 .422 1      
BQUAL 0 .368 -0 .24 0 .003 0 .004 -0 .097 0 .1412 1    
DACC 0 .116 -0 .17 -0 .019 0 .307 -0 .026 -0 .191 0 .204 1    
LE -0 .055 0 .132 -0 .087 -0 .236 0 .214 0 .104 0 .328 -0 .063 1   
GCONS 0 .061 0 .111 0 .228 -0 .319 -0 .305 0 .167 -0 .026 -0 .086 -0 .135 1  
INVPROF 0 .052 -0 .164 0 .178 0 .696 0 .091 -0 .056 0 .1042 0 .4819 -0 .288 -0 .208 1
Figure 1 provides a plot of the measure of PS against growth rates . The 
PS measure is an assessment of the quality of governance, the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared program (s) and its ability to stay in office. 
The rating is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of zero points . The subcomponents of the PS 
measure are government unity, legislative strength and popular support . For each 
subcomponent, a score of four points equates to very low risk and a score of zero 
points to very high risk. As a consequence of how its subcomponents are defined, 
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a PS score of twelve points equates to very low risk (stable) and zero points to 
very high risk (unstable) . 
 The PS measure was constructed using data from PRS’s International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset which covers 182 countries from 1980-2008 
and is widely considered by political science researchers as the most reliable and 
comprehensive data on political stability available . The PS measure makes sense 
for the principal argument of this paper since good governance, and a lack of 
conflict reflected in government unity, legislative strength and popular support 
contributes to growth by making aid more effective . The sub-components of the 
PS capture the milder forms of political stability which likely affect the aid-growth 
relationship even in the absence of catastrophic events such as wars making the 
PS measure the best one for our purposes . Further, note that although the ICRG 
data has been widely used in the literature on corruption and governance, (see 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, (1997)) its use is not as widespread in 
the aid and growth literature . The popularity of the ICRG data has, however, 
increased recently as Knack and Keefer (2001) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) 
both employed PRS’s ICRG data to study the impacts of aid on institutions and 
governance in SSA while Rajan and Subramanian, 2008, Arnd et al 2010, and 
Minoiu and Reddy, 2010) employ the measure in aid-growth regressions . These 
authors reported that the political stability measures provided meaningful and 
intuitive findings. It is also noteworthy that the PRS data accurately captures 
changes in historical political stability among countries and over time as will be 
explained. Further, other more “recent” governance indicators e.g. Mo Ibrahim’s 
index of governance provide rankings of countries which are consistent with the 
political stability measure used in this study providing some comfort that our 
measure is accurate. A final attribute of the PRS’s ICRG dataset is that it provides 
the widest range of stability data both in terms of the number of SSA countries 
available and years covered and uses a well documented and reliable method 
where country experts rate countries over time and is thus a perfect fit for our 
purposes .
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Figure 1. Growth Vs Political Stability, all SSA Countries, 1984-2007.

















Note: Range of Measure of PS is 0-12. Data Source: PoliticalResearch GrouP (PRS)
Stable SSA Countries
©2010 The Author (s)
Journal compilation ©2010 African Centre for Economics and Finance
64
Figure 3. Political Stability for the Least Stable SSA Countries, 1984-2007




Less Stable SSA countries
Note: Range of Measure of PS is 0-12. 











Source: Political Research Service (PRS)
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Figures 2-5 shows that the measure of PS is a credible measure of political 
conditions . For each country, there is variation in the PS measure over time, and 
for each period, there is variation across countries in the PS measure . Figures 2 
and 3 demonstrate that there is variation over time in the measure of PS not only 
for the most stable SSA countries like Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania, who 
have average PS values greater then 6 .8 (the mean PS), but also for the least 
stable SSA countries like Congo (DRC), Somalia and Liberia for which average 
PS is less than 6 .8 or the mean PS . For both the least stable and the most stable 
set of countries (Figure 2 and 3), the bulk of the high PS numbers is concentrated 
at the end of the data range, while the opposite holds true for the low PS numbers . 
This indicates a general rise in political stability of the SSA region more recently 
for the least stable countries and is consistent with observation . Further, the PS 
index values appear to correspond to perceptions of the political situation for the 
SSA countries over time . For example, Liberia has higher PS score for 2003-
2007 than for 1996-1999, when it was still plagued by conflict and uncertainty. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that for each year there is heterogeneity in the score of 
PS for SSA countries . Visual inspection of Figures 4 and 5 reveals that for the 
countries that are neither the least stable nor the most unstable, political stability 
has declined from 1999-2007, but only very slightly . The appendix contains the 
list of the SSA countries used in the research .
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5. Methods
The empirical growth model in (1) is applied to thirty-one SSA countries 
from 1984-2007 . Before estimating (1), the annual data were converted to four-
year averages, because one-year intervals are too short to capture growth rates 
(Deaton, 2008) .  
The possibility that endogeneity bias may arise from different sources 
(simultaneity or unobserved effects), the small size of our sample, and the lack 
of valid instruments for the potentially endogenous aid and political stability 
variables posed peculiar econometric challenges for the estimation of the growth 
equation . A small sample size typically causes problems in estimation of the 
aid-growth relation because the traditional IV estimation techniques used to 
correct for endogeneity bias such as two-stage least square (2SLS) produces 
inconsistent estimates when the sample size is small (Woolridge, 2002) . Further, 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity have low power in finite samples 
and may not detect endogeneity bias even when it is present . Even when the 
number of observations is sufficient, which would normally make traditional IV 
estimates consistent, traditional IV-type regressions are of little use in correcting 
endogeneity bias specifically in aid-growth regressions (Deaton, 2008). This is 
because in the context of SSA, none of the “standard” instruments for aid in the 
literature such as population (see BD, 2000), rainfall, (see Acemoglu, 2001), 
colonial legacy (see Islam, 2005 and Acemoglu, 2001), and primary exports and 
rainfall (see Bruckner, 2011) satisfies a major requirement for instrument validity: 
zero correlation between the instrument and the error term (exogeneity) . The aid-
literature has paid even less attention to evaluating whether the “standard” set 
of instruments for aid is sufficiently strong. This may be because most of the 
significant contributions to the aid literature occurred in the twentieth century 
while the literature on weak instrument (see Stock and Yogo (2005)) emerged 
more recently . Further, when instruments are weak, IV estimation is inconsistent 
(Bound, Jaegger and Baker, 1993) . We therefore drop instrumental variable (IV) 
analysis as a strategy for mitigating simultaneity bias . 
Unobserved effects such as cultural norms and historical tensions that affect 
growth also affect aid, political stability and policy, so that unobserved effects 
may account for a considerable portion of the total endogeneity bias . These 
unobserved effects can be removed by first differencing (FD). If such a strategy 
eliminates endogeneity bias we should notice corrected signs and stronger 
statistical significance of coefficients and better fit of the FD model relative to 
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OLS . Further, we lag the endogenous variables so that they are predetermined 
in the aid equation to reduce the possibility of simultaneity. Given sufficient 
data, GMM is the optimal estimation method because it treats both unobserved 
endogeneity and simultaneity endogeneity (Hansen and Tarp, 2001) . However, 
although we did perform such GMM estimations in previous versions of this 
paper we do not rely on results of the GMM dynamic panel model because it 
is likely fraught with finite sample bias since our dataset is small. Our current 
strategy of lagging AID, PS and AIDPS and estimating by FD eliminates all 
the unobserved endogeneity and is the correct estimation method . Residual 
simultaneity may persist however despite lagging PS, AID and AIDPS .  Fixed-
Effects (FE) is not applicable here, because the data is not strictly exogenous . 
Islam (2005) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) treat simultaneity with IV and 
find no significant simultaneity bias  since estimates of aid are the same as OLS 
in magnitude but Aguir (2011) using rainfall and primary exports as instruments 
for aid concludes that simultaneity biases his estimates upwards in IV estimation . 
In comparison, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgard and Hansen (2003) both 
use GMM and find contrasting results. While the former notes differences 
between GMM and OLS estimates, the latter does not find any differences so the 
controversy about the effect of endogeneity (direction and size) persists . 
6. Discussion of Results
The empirical strategy was executed to (i) identify and quantify the effect 
of foreign aid on growth in SSA (ii) to determine if political stability influences 
the aid-growth relationship, and (iii) to address any endogeneity problems that 
emerge . The main results of estimation of the growth equation (1) are presented 
in Table (3) on the next page . Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 display results of 
estimation of equation (1) respectively by OLS, and FD . In contrast, columns 3 
and 4 of Table 3 contain the same regressions in columns 1 and 2 but with the 
PS dropped to evaluate how important the influence of political stability is to the 
aid -growth relationship . Finally note that AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1 are lagged in 
the FD estimations (columns 2 and 4) but not in the OLS regressions (columns 
1 and 3) . This means for the FD estimations (but not the OLS regressions), 
AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1 are pre-determined in the growth regression so there 
is little simultaneity bias . OLS estimation is performed with both lagged and 
contemporaneous aid, political stability and their interactions (AIDt, PSt and 
AIDPSt) but results of only the contemporaneous variables are reported (as there 
is little difference between the two) to facilitate comparison of our OLS results 
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with estimated coefficients of the aid-growth relationship in the literature. All 
regressions in Table 3 are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
using FGLS .
Table 3 . Growth Regression Results . 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD OLS FD
IGDP -0 .0001 -0 .003 0 .009 -0 .001
(-1 .15) (2 .04)* (-0 .39) (0 .97)
AID 12 .05 8 .066 0 .232 5 .775
(2 .19)* (2 .62)* (0 .15) (1 .95)
PS 1 .084 1 .593
(4 .12)*** (4 .94)***
PRIM 0 .098 0 .744 0 .043 1 .299
(0 .22) (0 .25) (0 .09) (0 .45)
M2 0 .049 0 .106 0 .049 0 .108
(1 .64) (2 .51)* (1 .39) (1 .92)
BQUAL 0 .727 1 .303 0 .583 0 .99
(1 .61) (1 .98) (1 .37) (1 .41)
DACC 0 .253 1 .535 0 .363 1 .102
(0 .77) (2 .13) (1 .1) (1 .51)
GCONS -0 .007 -0 .095 -0 .004 -0 .198
(-0 .18) (-0 .84) (-0 .1) (1 .44)
LE 0 .013 0 .184 0 .024 0 .157
(0 .46) (2 .00)* (0 .76) (1 .69)
INVPROF 0 .078 0 .946 0 .483 0 .025
(0 .3) (1 .5) (2 .56)* (0 .06)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD OLS FD
IGDP -0 .0001 -0 .003 0 .009 -0 .001
(-1 .15) (2 .04)* (-0 .39) (0 .97)
AID 8 .454 8 .066 0 .232 5 .775
(2 .19)* (2 .62)* (0 .15) (1 .95)
PS 1 .084 1 .593
(4 .12)*** (4 .94)***
PRIM 0 .098 0 .744 0 .043 1 .299
Note . Each regression included a set of time dummies . Errors are corrected for serial       
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correlation  and heteroskedasticity .  The AID, PS and AIDPS variables are all lagged one 
period in the FD estimations.  Three outliers  identified in the text, were deleted in each       
regression . Student t-statistics  in parentheses .
* Significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5% ***;  significant at 1%***
The FD estimations appear to fit the data better than the OLS because their 
coherence measures such as t-values of individual coefficients are higher than 
the OLS values irrespective of whether political stability is in the equation or 
not . The major result of the research as presented in the different Columns of 
Table 3 is that aid and political stability both positively impact growth in SSA . 
This is because from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, aid, political stability and their 
interactions are positively related to growth at five percent significance level, 
respectively, by OLS and FD although the magnitude of the aid coefficient in the 
FD equation is smaller than in the OLS equation . Most importantly, since AIDPS, 
the interaction of aid and political stability is also significant, we conclude that 
conditional on stability aid promotes growth . 
 The reduction in magnitude of the coefficients on aid for the FD 
estimate may be explained by the difference in the level of endogeneity treatment 
that OLS and FD respectively provide . Omitted variable bias, which cannot 
be reduced by OLS, went down with FD, indicating that unobserved country-
specific effects constitute the majority of any possible omitted variable bias. Any 
remaining bias has to be time-varying as FD removes all time-invariant sources 
of bias .  In the current paper, although I am able to remove  the time-invariant 
unobserved effects by FD, endogeneity bias, albeit very limited, may still exist 
due to simultaneity despite lagging AID, AIDPS and PS . I seriously evaluated 
the possibility of endogeneity arising from simultaneity in earlier versions of 
the paper . In particular, I estimated the aid-growth equations by IV after re-
specifying the model as a system of 4-simultaneous equations. Although first 
stage regression F-statistics and the Stock and Yogo (2005) test suggested the 
instruments were not very strong, I got very similar results in terms of the signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients on (AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1) to the OLS so 
simultaneity does not appear to be an issue but unobserved effect endogeneity is 
an issue. Given sufficient number of observations, a dynamic system GMM will 
be the best estimator to treat simultaneity concurrently with unobserved effect 
endogeneity if in fact both simultaneity and unobserved effects endogeneity were 
really both issues . Contrary to my fears simultaneity is not the issue here so 
FD suffices. We did perform the system GMM but the results in terms of the 
magnitude and signs of AID, PS and AIDPS are similar to FD . 
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For completeness, note that there may still be a simultaneity problem if 
there are unobserved time-varying country-specific characteristics that influence 
aid and growth . To account for this issue, in earlier versions of the paper, I used 
the “random growth” specification (Papke, 1994) that allows for endogeneity to 
be based on country-specific growth rates. I interacted a trend variable with the 
country dummies in a LSDV specification to accomplish this. This did not change 
the OLS results much so it seems that the bias is mainly based on time-invariant 
variables . Finally, given that the sample size is small which compromised the 
strength of the instruments for aid in GMM and IV these estimation strategies 
offer no improvement over FD . 
 In comparison to results in columns 1 and 2, aid and political stability 
are insignificant in Columns 3 and 4 where political stability is omitted 
indicating political stability is an important pre-condition for aid . The majority 
of the coefficients of the other variables in our model have the expected sign in 
both OLS and FD estimations, where PS is included, although not many have 
statistically significant coefficients
To determine the economic relevance of the aid-growth relationship in SSA, 
we compute the marginal effects (MEs) of growth with respect to aid . The MEs 
were calculated for the OLS and FD estimations in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
3 .  We obtained a value of 0 .12 for the ME of growth with respect to aid using 
OLS where aid is not lagged so that a one percent increase in aid will lead to a 
0 .12 percent increase in growth .  In other words since AID is scaled by GDP, 
a $1 increase in aid will lead to a $0 .12 increase in GDP . Further, we obtain a 
value of 0 .084 for the same ME using FD where aid is lagged after taking the 
significant AIDPS in the FD regression into account. In comparison Islam (2005) 
finds using OLS (and data from all LDCs not just SSA) that a unit increase in aid 
as a fraction of GDP, increases growth by 0 .12 percent for LDCs which agrees 
with our results . 
Decomposition of the Effect of Political Stability on the Aid-Growth 
Regression:  Marginal Effects and Elasticities at different points (0-12) of 
PS.
To further decompose the effect of PS on the aid-growth relationship, we 
compute the aid-growth effect at different values of PS . From Figure 6, the 
marginal effect (ME) of aid on growth computed at the median of growth and aid 
is positive and rises very gradually at low levels of PS . Keeping in mind that the 
PS scale is from 0-12 with 12 being most stable, it can be seen that at very high 
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levels of PS (higher than the mean and median of PS), ME rises precipitously .  In 
fact, AID, AIDPS and PS are all weakly significant below a PS value of 6 at 5% 
significance level. At PS values greater than 6 (the median of PS), these variables 
are strongly significant at 5% significance level.  
Figure 6. Partial Effects at Different Levels of Political Stability
 
Figure 7. Elasticity at Different Levels of Political Stability
Figure 7, which plots the elasticity of growth with respect to aid against PS, 
substantiates the point made in figure 6 because it shows that growth is inelastic 
at low levels of PS but elastic at very high levels of PS . Beyond the relatively 




Elasticity  (Partial Effect * AID/Growth at the median)
Elasticity
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percent increase in growth .  However, the majority of poor SSA countries have 
PS values lower than 10 which might explain of why the effect of aid on growth 
is sometimes difficult to discern in SSA. 
7. Conclusion
The research objective was to determine the sign and economic relevance 
of the relationship between aid and growth in SSA and further to investigate 
the consequence of political stability and economic policies on the aid-growth 
relationship . The evidence suggests that aid and growth are positively related at 
the five percent significance level, that political stability has a strong influence 
on the aid-growth relationship in SSA and that the aid-growth relationship 
suffers from endogeneity bias caused by unobserved effects . Our results help to 
clarify why so much aid has done so little good in SSA . Aid is currently given 
independent of country stability. Based on our findings, aid is more effective at 
higher levels of stability so reaching the millennium development goals is more 
likely when aid is provided to stable SSA countries .  Aid can prevent starvation 
in poor unstable SSA countries, but cannot be expected to spur growth there . 
A policy recommendation of this paper is that the pursuit of political stability 
and good governance in SSA is not only a worthy objective in itself, but also 
because stability promotes growth and augments the growth-promoting power 
of aid . To make the principal results of this research that political stability makes 
aid more efficient at promoting growth-more meaningful, the determinants of 
political stability specifically in SSA are good candidates for further research. In 
particular it will be interesting to investigate how big a role a free press plays in 
the attainment of political stability . Preliminary evidence (Armah and Amoah, 
2010) seem to suggest that in SSA, political stability is fragile in one direction 
and stable and restrictive in the other direction when the press is restrained . 
However little empirical evidence is available in the literature to refute or back 
this claim so more careful research into the problem is needed . Further research 
is also needed to find out if growth is linked with media freedom in SSA. 
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